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Abstract: This paper deals with the prevention of security issues on mobile agents in IP Networks. We propose a new 
security computing model based on trusted server to avert Eavesdropping and Alternation attacks. The new 
protocol will be implemented using IBM mobile agent platform, Aglet. The new framework consists of 
components that provide support to the mobile agent while it is touring hosts in the agent space. It also protects 
the confidentiality and integrity of parts of the mobile agent. We conduct performance analysis over different 
types of mobile agents over a real IP Traces under malicious actions. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are designed using 
independent, autonomous known as agents which can 
perform their tasks independently or collectively in 
different types of environments. The agents can be 
considered as processes with the ability to perform an 
action on the environment on behalf of user. These 
systems allow distribution of complex tasks amongst 
agents. One of the basic properties of multi-agent 
system is its ability of self-organization which makes 
it utterly desirable for autonomous and flexible 
system designs such as graphical applications, 
logistics, transportation, search engines, network 
management etc . 
Mobile Agent Systems can be divided based into 
programming language by which they are developed 
and use: Java and non-Java based. Around 85% of 
Mobile Agent systems available today are built using 
Java, due to its inherent support to Mobile Agent 
programming.   
Mobile Agents are becoming a focus of modern 
research because of their applications in distributed 
systems which are replacing traditional client-server 
architectures rapidly.  However, one of the key 
concerns in practical implementation of Mobile 
Agent is the lack of protection against any threats.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. 
Related work is provided in section 2. Section 3   
provides the security issues that a Mobile Agent can 
counter while visiting another host in the network.  
The proposed approach design is explained in section 
4. In section 5, we present our experimental works 
and check the capability, reaction and performance of 
the mobile agents based on the developed design. 
Finally in section 6, we present the conclusion and 
our future work. 
2 RELATED WORKS 
Several researches have been conducted over mobile 
Agents. 
Some Articles showed what exactly it is makes 
Java such a powerful tool for mobile agent 
development, also it highlighted some shortcomings 
in Java language systems that have implications for 
the conceptual design and use of Java-based mobile 
agent systems. 
Other studies concentrate their work on the fault 
tolerance techniques in mobile agents, network 
management applications based on mobile agent 
technologies and how the fault tolerance techniques 
can improve their performance. 
Other articles worked on an agent-based 
intelligent mobile assistant for supporting users prior 
to and during the execution of their tasks. 
In addition, some works have been performed to 
integrate the mobile agents with the e-commerce. 
Some technical relevant issues are well presented. 
Some researches concentrated their work on 
security concerns (i.e masquerading, denial of 
service, unauthorized access and repudiation) of 
mobile agents and how to protect them by several 
techniques like for example providing logical 
framework designed to support large-scale 
 heterogeneous mobile agent applications, on safe 
code interpretation, digital signatures, path histories, 
State Appraisal and Proof-Carrying Code (PCC). 
In this paper, we will provide a brief about the 
security threats that a mobile agent can counter while 
hosting other hosts in the network. A new approach 
for preventing against these attacks will be proposed 
based on trusted server. It consists of components that 
provide support to the mobile agent to secure its 
mission in the agent space. It also protects the 
confidentiality and integrity of parts of the mobile 
agent. We will conduct performance analysis over a 
real IP Traces integrated with these attacks  
3 SECURITY ISSUES AND 
COUNTERMEASURES 
Security is one of the key factors of MAS. In fact, a 
MA is one of the potential threats to computer 
systems and vice versa, from the host system to the 
MAS itself. In this part, we will talk about the main 
security issues related to MAS. 
   The security threats for MASs could be divided as 
follows:  
• Agent Protection: A remote host can threaten 
an agent; for example an untrusted host could 
execute an agent, observe its data and make 
some changes to them. Moreover, the threat 
could be from another agent in the domain, 
agent to agent threaten. Also unauthorized third 
parties threaten an agent. Through the agents 
communications a malicious entity may 
captures these messages and alter them. 
• Host protection: An arriving malicious agent 
might threaten a host, the agent can access 
other data and files on the local host and might 
induce a serious damage.  The other threat of 
the host is from unauthorized third parties; it is 
possible to send a host many spam agents that 
stress the host and take all its available 
processing power. 
• Network protection: Incoming malicious 
agents threaten the network; in this case, the 
agents can clone themselves and flood the 
network with an excessive number of agents. 
Possible attack here is called denial of service 
attack (DOS). 
   There are many security services that can be used 
for securing the agents systems, for example; 
authentication, integrity, confidentiality and 
authorization. 
   In case of the authentication, the host needs to know 
the sender of the delivered agent. The agent 
authentication process includes verifying the entity 
that programmed the agent and also verifying the 
entity that dispatched it to the host. Basically, the 
agent and the host need to know with whom they are 
talking and dealing with, here the public-key 
encryption or passwords can be used. 
   For integrity, checking the integrity of the agents is 
a technique that makes sure no one has made any 
changes to the agents, the agents travelling form on 
host to another, and communicates and exchanges 
their data with other hosts and other agents. In this 
case, we need to make sure that the agents have not 
been tampered with in relation to their state, code or 
data. Moreover, the agents could carry different types 
of data, for example some private data. These data 
should only be readable from a specific host or 
agents. This technique is very important to avoid an 
eavesdropping threat. 
   The last service which helps to protect the agents 
and the hosts is authorization; the incoming agents 
should have a specific right to access the host 
information, so different agents have different 
authority, to protect the hosts and also to protect 
themselves. 
4 NEW PROPOSED APPROACH 
Our proposed countermeasure is based on trust. A 
mobile agent can host either blind folded, based on 
policy enforcement, or based on control and 
punishment.  
   A blind folded is the Mobile Agent which “simply 
need to trust its entertaining host”. The host is free to 
do whatever it wants while giving services to the 
Mobile Agent. But it is trusted that it neither has 
malicious behaviour nor collaborate with other 
hostile hosts that perform some bad actions on the 
agent.  
   Policy enforcement is another trust. In this case, the 
Mobile Agent and the host have a prior contractual 
relationship in the form of policy. Both parties need 
to sign for their rights and obligations.  
The last trust is control and punishment. There is no 
needed policy to be signed between the two parties as 
well as there is no contract signed. The trust assumes 
that hosts are not by nature malicious and give them 
a chance to behave accordingly. But it still uses 
control mechanism to punish the host if found guilty 
of misbehaviours. 
   Our solution is a combination of policy 
enforcement and on control and punishment.  
The below section outlines the guidelines used to 
develop the countermeasure. 
 4.1 Proposed Countermeasure 
Mobile Agents are subjected to any type of attacks 
because they are a lonely figure once sent to the agent 
space. Hence, the proposition modifies the computing 
model of the mobile computation in order to address 
hostile host threats.  
Figure 1 shows an overview of the mobile 
computing model. It is mandatory that the home or 
owner of the Mobile Agent has a public-private key 
pair at its disposal, the public key is published to the 
world so that the Mobile Agent could retrieve this key 
while it is visiting hosts. These keys are used by the 
security protocol to protect the confidentiality and the 
integrity of parts of the Mobile Agent.  
 
Figure 1: Proposed new model. 
The proposal modifies the way by which the 
mobile computation is done. The arrows dictate that, 
the Mobile Agent first goes to the trusted node, 
creates a temporary storage element called active 
storage element (ASE), then moves to the first host to 
be visited. It goes there, sends the information it has 
retrieved from the corresponding host to be stored 
temporarily at ASE. The trusted node accepts the 
information and stores it. Each Mobile Agent that has 
a trust relationship with this node does the same, 
creates its own ASE at the trusted node and uses it to 
store the partial information it retrieves from each 
hosts. At the end, the Mobile Agent returns back to 
the trusted node and asks the corresponding ASE to 
hand it over the results it has been accumulating so 
far, carry back the result to its home as if it has been 
doing the job alone.  
   It is assumed that the agent space is divided into 
regions, within each region a node called trusted 
server is setup. These servers provide various services 
to the Mobile Agent while the agent is in the agent 
space. The Mobile Agent supported by these trusted 
nodes should be able to avert some of the evil acts 
from hostile hosts. The division of the agent space 
into regions is analogous to the cells in the mobile 
communication systems.  
Nowadays, it is familiar to introduce trusted 
server setup in a network handled by a third party. 
Plenty of servers deployed in the internet word uses a 
trusted server like Web servers, mail servers and 
Domain Name Services (DNS) servers. Trusted 
servers do not have the right to modify the Mobile 
Agent’s content, as web servers do not modify the 
web page they host. But here the security protocol 
provides further protection to the Mobile Agent 
content at the trusted server. It is such a similar 
concept that the proposition wants to exploit. The 
nodes and the trusted servers could be set up, in a 
similar style as nodes of root Web servers, by the 
Mobile Agent user community.  
    In sections to follow, we will take a look at the 
main components of the proposed countermeasure 
approach and how should the components interact 
according to the security protocol. 
4.2 Components of the Proposed 
Countermeasure 
Figure 1 shows the overall view of the proposal shows 
that the countermeasure constitutes various 
components at various degree of multiplicity. Below 
is the component of our proposed approach: 
 Home of the Mobile Agent 
 Mobile Agent (MA) 
 Trusted Node 
 Active Storage Element 
 Home 
4.2.1 Home of the Mobile Agent 
It is the computer running Mobile Agent platform and 
has sent the Mobile Agent to carry out a task on its 
behalf. It can also be defined as a computer running a 
Mobile Agent based distributed application. The 
Mobile Agent after completing its task will return to 
the home carrying the result. 
4.2.2 Mobile Agent 
It is a program that migrates from one node to another 
node in a computer network to accomplish a given 
task. 
4.2.3 Active Storage Element 
It is a temporary storage element created by each 
Mobile Agent, at the trusted server. It actively 
participates in the process of temporary information 
 storage and handing over of all the information to the 
Mobile Agent.  
4.2.4 Host 
It is a computer in the agent space running Mobile 
Agent platform and entertains any visiting Mobile 
Agent which would like to gather information from it. 
This component is at the center of the controversy, 
which could be hostile. The host provides all the 
necessary resources for the agent to execute there. 
4.3 Security Protocol 
A security protocol defines how components of the 
system (Home, Trusted Nodes and Active Storage 
Element) should interact with each other as well as 
what are the necessary tasks need  to be performed at 
each level in order to secure the network from any 
malicious actions.  
The security protocol is free to take or alter any 
action on the Mobile Agent. While the Mobile Agent 
is travelling between its home and trusted nodes the 
usual composition is deemed. But when the agent is 
visiting different nodes, it is assumed to be composed 
of only the two out of the three components that is 
usually associated with: code and state, to give hostile 
hosts no chance of disclosure of information collected 
from previous hosts. 
Another function of the security protocol is to 
develop a mechanism that lets the user of the Mobile 
Agent to digitally sign the list of destinations it wants 
the Mobile Agent to visit. After creating the list of 
destination, it digitally signs the destination object 
using its private key, then the destination object is 
passed down to the Mobile Agent. The Mobile Agent, 
upon its arrival at each host in the network, verifies 
that it has a valid copy of the destination object before 
putting that object into use. By this, the Mobile Agent 
avoids the possibility that it would be directed to visit 
other hosts by altering the list of paths it has carried 
from its home, as any malicious host could not forged 
the digitally signed destination object.  
We can find below the security protocol in action 
in every step in the agent step. It is assumed that, the 
home node has a public-private key pair (HPubK-
HPrvK).The public key could be retrieved by the 
hosts from relevant authorities. 
4.3.1 At Home 
The user of the MAS specifies the address of the list 
of hosts that will visit using the Agent Based 
Application (ABA).  
The ABA takes the list and forms a destination 
object. The destination object contains the list of hosts 
to be visited, the address of the trusted server (TS) and 
the home. The ABA then digitally signs the 
destination object and passes it to the MAS. The MAS 
accepts the signed object. By using HPubK, the MAS 
verifies that it has the right un-signed destination 
object from which the address of the next node to be 
visited is determined and dispatches itself to that 
node, as pointed out in the previous section it goes 
first to the Trusted Node, Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Proposed model at home. 
4.3.2 At Trusted Server 
The MAS arrives at the TS. It creates its own Active 
Storage Element (ASE). The MAS passes down the 
necessary information to the ASE so it can 
communicate with it. The MAS retrieves the public 
key of the home, HPubK. Using this key, the MAS 
un-signs the digitally signed destination object and 
determines the next node to be visited. In this case, it 
is the first host in the list and the MA Dispatches itself 
to that node, Figure. 3.  
 
Figure 3: Proposed model at Trusted Server. 
4.3.3 At Trusted Server, After the Reach of 
the Nth Host 
The MAS arrives at the TS. It asks the corresponding 
ASE to hand it the information it has been 
accumulating (a pair of HPubK(SymK_i) and 
SymK_i(Info_i) retrieved from each host), and takes 
these information. After un-signing its destination 
 object, it looks for the address of the next node to be 
visited. In this case for sure it is the home node and 
the MAS dispatches itself to its home, Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: Proposed Model at Trusted Server, after the reach 
of the Nth Host. 
4.3.4 At Home 
The MAS arrives back at home after completing its 
mission. The MAS contains a pair of encrypted 
information. The MAS hands the overall information 
to the ABA. For each pair of encrypted information 
retrieved from each host, the ABA does the 
following: 
- First, using its private key (HPrvK) to 
decrypt the encrypted symmetric key, 
HPubK (SymK_i) ,  
- Second, using the decrypted symmetric 
key, SymK_i, it decrypts the 
information which is encrypted using 
the same key, SymK_i (Info_i),  
The ABA does the same process for each pair of 
information retrieved from every host the agent goes 
to collect information. At last the ABA displays the 
result to the user, Info_i.  
4.4 Security Protocol Summary for N 
Hosts 
You can find below a summary for the security 
protocol:  
 N hosts addresses digitally signed by the home 
node.  
 One ASE created at TS. 
 N symmetric random keys generated at each 
host.  
 N information retrieved will be encrypted by the 
corresponding N symmetric keys.  
 The N symmetric keys will be encrypted by the 
public key (RSA) of the home.  
 The encrypted N information and encrypted keys 
stored at the ASE.  
 Decryption at home node and displaying the 
plain text result to the user.  
5 EXPERIMENTALS RESULTS 
In this section, we present the result of the 
implementation of the security policy as well as the 
result of the performance comparison between 
different types of mobile agents.  
   The following techniques and tools are used: Two 
workstations with 8 GB and 768 MB of RAM 
respectively, which run Windows Server 2003 and a 
number of Mobile Agents (Proposed MA, DS MA 
and Normal MA) as described below, are used. 
 
 Normal Mobile Agent (Normal MA):  An Agent 
that executes mobile computation in the usual 
way 
 Proposed Mobile Agent (Proposed MA): A 
Mobile Agent which is directed by the security 
protocol mentioned in section 4. 
 Digitally Signed Mobile Agent (DSMA): A 
Mobile Agent that supports digital signing of 
the destination object while still performing 
computation.  
   We have considered the above describe mobile 
agents will have to execute the similar path. 
   To measure the capability of the proposal towards 
eavesdropping threat, a test environment is set up 
using the above mentioned computers as shown in 
Figure 5. Computer A is considered to act as trusted 
server (TS) and computer B runs many host nodes 
simulated through various port numbers as well as the 
home node in a virtualized mode. Wireshark Network 
Packet Analyzer will be running regularly over 
computer A. its job is to capture, sniff packets in a 
network and store them. 
 
Figure 5: Experimental Lab. 
The Figure 6 shows analysis of the packet captured 
while the Normal MA and DS MA are in execution. 
 As it is shown, in either cases it is possible to 
eavesdrop what information is retrieved and 
exchanged at each host: “OS Architecture: x86; OS 
Version: 5.2”. 
 
Figure 6: Captured packet analysis for DS MA and normal 
MA. 
Figure 7 shows analysis of the captured packet 
while the Proposed MA is in operation. As it can be 
seen from the figure, unlike the above case since the 
information is sent to the TS in encrypted form, it is 
not possible to look into its content. Hence, the 
security protocol provides the required 
confidentiality of the information while it is being 
stored at ASE.  
Figure 7: Captured packet analysis for Proposed MA. 
   A different type of attacks is performed: Alteration 
threat. The similar test environment as in the above 
case is used, except that all of the nodes are simulated 
in computer.  
   A malicious node is interfering on a different port 
number in the Computer B. This node is planned to 
behave maliciously towards the Proposed MA; its 
goal is to supply a wrong public key to the MA as it 
arrives there and is in the process of un-signing its 
digitally signed destination object. But fortunately the 
MA cannot un-sign the signed object using the public 
key just supplied. This is because the destination 
object is signed by the private key of the home node, 
not by a private key which corresponds to the public 
key supplied by the hostile node. Therefore, any 
attempt of alteration of destination object will be 
detected by the MA. 
 
Performance Comparison:  
To measure the performance of every mobile agents 
(Normal, DS, Proposed MA) a similar test 
environment as above is used. Their performance is 
compared in terms of their average turnaround time, 
measured in milliseconds (ms).  
   This performance parameter is the average time in 
milliseconds (ms) each Mobile Agent requires to do 
the job, after dispatched till it returns and handovers 
the result to the user.  
   As expected DS Mobile Agent takes in between of 
the two. Comparing the execution time of the Normal 
MA with the Proposed MA, the Proposed MA needs 
approximately 5x more time as shown in Figure 8. 
This substantial amount of time is a price to pay to 
achieve the corresponding security: Generation of the 
keys, encryption of partial information, verification 
of destination object at each visited host and at last 
collecting the results back to the Mobile Agent from 
the TS all add up to form a big turnaround time.  
 
Figure 8: Performance Comparison Between Different 
Types of Mobile Agents. 
Comparing the performance time between DS 
MA and Proposed MA, the DS MA needs less time. 
This is due to the fact that DS MA does not carry out 
some of the functions the Proposed MA performs 
like: Generation of keys, Encryption. It takes time 
since it verifies that the destination object is valid 
copy on its arrival at each and every host.  
 
Figure 9 compares the execution time for all 
Mobile Agent cases. As the number of nodes to be 
visited is steadily increased, we notice that the 
turnaround time increases. This is tribute to the fact 
that there are more jobs to be done. 
 
Figure 9: Performance time trend as the number of nodes 
visited increases. 
 6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we proposed a new framework based on 
trusted server and developed by IBM platform Aglet 
to prevent security issues over mobile agents. The 
proposed approach evaluated how different types of 
mobile agents can react based on real traces with 
attacks. Our experimental results show that the 
proposal mobile agent needs approximately 4x more 
time than a normal agent to execute its job. This is 
cause of the  Generation of the keys, encryption of 
partial information, verification of destination object 
at each visited host and at last collecting the results 
back to the Mobile Agent from the TS all add up to 
form a big turnaround time. Indeed, we compared the 
execution time for all Mobile Agent cases. As the 
number of nodes to be visited is increased, we notice 
that the turnaround time increases. This is tribute to 
the fact that there are more jobs to be done. 
   In our future work, we will focus on detecting 
flooding attacks over mobile agents. We will propose 
a new framework for the detection of flooding attacks 
by integrating Power Divergence over Sketch data 
structure. The performance of the proposed 
framework is investigated in terms of detection 
probability and false alarm ratio.  
We also intend to provide a method for reducing the 
amount of monitoring data on high speed networks, 
and to analyze the impact of sampling on the 
precision of this divergence measure. 
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